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Abstract
Background: China has five layers of government including the central government.
Recently, some prefectural governments meet fiscal distress.
Methods: We investigate the effects of urban and rural populations and area sizes
on the expenditures of the prefecture-level local government by estimating quintile
regression.
Results: At around 220,000 people, per capita local government expenditure for urban
populations is minimized in our simulation. The expenditure for rural populations is
proportional to the population size. The expenditure in accordance with the areas is
also proportional to the area size.
Conclusions: The cost structure is the reason why China’s recent rapid urbanization
increases prefectural government’s fiscal distress.
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Background
China has five layers of government including the central government. Each level of
government, except the central government, receives financial transfers from the
higher ranks of government and distributes the financial transfers to the lower levels
of government. This system has operated since China’s national foundation. As for the
tax collection system, the tax contracting system changed to the tax sharing system in
1994. In addition to these tax collecting and intergovernmental financial transfer
systems, there is another set of financial resources for each level of government, for
example, several kinds of charges or rental fees. These are extrabudgetary revenues,
and these finance the extrabudgetary expenditures for each level of government. There
are several studies and explanations of this complex system. Ahmad (1997) reviews this
system including its history, Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2006) summarize recent
reforms to the system, and Man (2011) focuses on the local financial system.
Recently, urbanization in China has been rapid and nationwide. This trend has
induced additional demand for public expenditure at each level of local govern-
ment. Most prefectural governments face financial problems. Tsui (2005) investi-
gated the effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers on the equalization of fiscal
expenditures across counties. To remove or reduce such financial distress, several
researchers have suggested several kinds of reforms of local government fiscal
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systems or intergovernmental transfer systems; for example, the World Bank (2007)
discussed the reforms to China’s tax system and intergovernmental fiscal system
and transfer totally, and Bahl (2011) examined decentralization and revenue
assignment.
However, most studies have proposed changes to the intergovernmental financial
transfer system or tax revenue systems. Few of them mention the adequacy of the five-
layer government system or optimal level or size of local government or local govern-
ment’s roles in providing public goods or services. Prefecture populations vary from
7000 to 2,239,000, and prefecture areas vary from 86 to 198,318 km2.1 Some prefec-
tures consist only of farmers, and others have relatively large urban populations.
Additionally, there are some prefectural governments in metropolitan areas, includ-
ing Tianjin and Shanghai. In such cases, it might be impossible to develop a re-
form that maintains the sizes or systems of prefectures. In this paper, to evaluate
the adequacy of the five-layer local government system, we investigate the efficient
scale of prefectures from a minimizing government expenditure viewpoint, using
data from 2037 prefectures, which excludes some prefectures within metropolitan
areas and missing observations.
Following several previous studies, we consider whether local government expendi-
tures are determined by local population and area size. Most prefectures, however, are
composed of both urban and rural areas, so we assume that local government expendi-
tures depend on urban and rural populations and area size. We also assume that the
total amount of government expenditures is determined by a quartic function of each
factor. This assumption corresponds to the assumption that per capita expenditures is
a cubic function. The reason why we assume a cubic function for per capita expendi-
tures is that several previous studies assumed a U-shaped function for per capita
expenditures for several public services or costs. Additionally, by allowing a non-
symmetrical U-shaped function for per capita expenditures in levels to capture the
asymmetric marginal effects below and above the lowest (optimal) point, we as-
sume a cubic function.2 In the estimation process, we find too much variation in
per capita expenditures even when we control several factors, so we apply a quan-
tile regression approach to the data. From the estimated results, we analyze the ef-
ficient scales for urban and rural populations and area size.
Methods
Literature survey of efficient scale of local governments
Oates (1972) examined fiscal federalism, and several subsequent studies investigated
systems of local public finance. Some of these studies, such as Alesina and Spolare
(2003), examined the optimal size of governments or nations. Other authors have dis-
cussed the optimal combination or layers of local governments, for example, Hochman
et al. (1995) and Baleiras (2001).3 To investigate the real size of local governments, we
must first examine the cost structures of local public services. The empirical analysis of
Shelton (2007), which investigated the determinants of central and local governments’
total expenditure and expenditures on some specific items using international data, fo-
cused on the optimal allocation of service provisions among central and local
governments.
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Many papers have examined the cost structure or efficiency of providing local
public services. Most of these studies attempt to investigate the cost structures of
specific public services such as the police or fire department, schools, sewage, or
water supply services and so on. For example, Hirsch (1959) investigated total ex-
penditure on police services, refuse collection, fire protection, and education ser-
vices. He fitted a quadratic function of population and found inverted U-shaped
relationships with various kinds of expenditures, which suggest the existence of
economies of scale. Bodkin and Conklin (1971) conducted a similar analysis on per
capita local public expenditures. They found a U-shaped relationship between per
capita total expenditure and population but did not find U-shaped relationships
with some specific public expenditure items. Beaton (1974) fitted linear regression
equations to the cost of police services by population size of cities. Borcherding
and Deacon (1972) also fitted simple log-linear equations to several outputs of
public services. Craig (1987), Craig and Heikkila (1989), and Edwards (1990) intro-
duced congestion functions and estimated the degrees of congestion in providing
public safety and others. Ladd (1992) estimated a piecewise linear function and ob-
tained asymmetric U-shaped cost function. Solé-Ollé and Bosch (2005) took a simi-
lar approach. Duncombe et al. (1995) also found asymmetric relationships between
school size and expenditures. Several studies have fitted quadratic functions to the
cost structure of local public services: Hirsch (1965) for refuse collections, Knapp
(1982) for crematoria, and Tao and Yuan (2005) for public elementary schools.
Furthermore, in relation to other aspects of cost structures, Ladd (1994) and Nel-
son (1992) investigated the relationship between population growth and counties’
expenditures. Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2003) investigated the effects of population
growth and changes in population densities from the aspect of urban sprawl. Dun-
combe and Yinger (1993) extended this type of analysis to multiple types of public
services and estimated the degree of economies of scope. Au and Henderson
(2006) focused on the agglomeration effect of cities in China and estimated an
inverted U-shaped function for productivity.4
When we estimate the cost structure of specific public services, we cannot determine
the optimal size of the local government. However, this type of research provides evidence
regarding which level or layer of government should supply police or other specific public
services. When we estimate the total expenditure function, we can directly investigate the
efficient scale of the local government. However, this type of analysis is limited by the
existing roles of local government within the current central–local government system.
In this paper, we investigate the efficient scale of prefectural government; thus,
our paper adopts the latter type of analysis. According to Martinez-Vazquez and
Qiao (2011), prefectural government mainly provides services related to public se-
curity, social security, and health care within the current five-layer government sys-
tem in China. As for the prefectural government’s expenditure shares, the top four
items are capital investment, education, government administration, and public se-
curity. We cannot obtain each prefecture’s detailed fiscal expenditures. This is an-
other reason why we cannot apply the former type of studies to some specific
public services. In this paper, we assume that total prefectural expenditures also
have U-shaped cost structures as do specific expenditures, e.g., public security,
education or government administration.
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Econometric model for aggregated data
The details of local government expenditures are not available. We only have budgetary
expenditures and extrabudgetary expenditures in total. Therefore, we investigate the
determinants of total of budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures (G). We assume
that this total expenditure consists of three components: expenditure for urban popula-
tion (GU), expenditure for rural population (GA), and expenditure related to area size
(GS):
G ¼ GU þ GA þ GS:
Then, each of these three components is a quartic function of each factor:
GU ¼ α0 þ α1UPopþ α2UPop2 þ α3UPop:3α4UPop:4;
GA ¼ β0 þ β1RPopþ β2RPop2 þ β3RPop3 þ β4RPop4;
GS ¼ γ0 þ γ1Areaþ γ2Area2 þ γ3Area3 þ γ4Area4;
Where UPop, RPop, and Area are urban population, rural population, and area size, re-

















































































using the following reparameterization:
δ ¼ α0 þ β0 þ γ0:
The relation between total population (Pop) and urban and rural populations,






and we can rewrite the equation and add the error term as
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Furthermore, we introduce a reparameterization of
ϕ ¼ β1−α1
and an additional factor to determine the expenditures: number of towns or villages
in each prefecture (NTowns). Finally, we obtain the estimation equation:
G
Pop





































The reason why we introduce NTowns as an additional explanatory variable is that
each prefecture makes fiscal transfers to towns or villages within the prefectures and
each town or village has fixed costs associated with the provision of their public ser-
vices. Of course, we can consider other variables to explain the per capita expenditures,
e.g., prefectural government’s export, human capital or per capita GDP.6 In the present
paper, we focus on investigating the effects of rural and urban population and areas, so
we do not include other variables as explanatory variables except NTowns. Also, we
cannot obtain the export and human capital data of prefectures. In the following
sections, we estimate this equation (1) by OLS or another estimation method.
Results and discussion
Data and OLS estimation
In this section, we report the estimation results of equation (1) by OLS. Before ex-
ploring the results, we describe the data used in this paper. We use data for 2037
prefectures in the estimation. The coverage and sample size in each province or
municipality are shown in Table 1. The coverage of our sample is 71.3 % because
we delete the data of prefectures within metropolitan areas and some missing data
exist. We collect data for urban and rural populations and area size from the 2009
China County Statistical Yearbook and prefectures’ budgetary and extrabudgetary
expenditures7 from the 2009 National Prefecture, City, County Fiscal Statistical
Book. Summary statistics of the data are shown in Table 2. The measurement units
of the data are as follows: G is in 10,000 yuan; Pop, UPop, and RPop are in 10,000
people; Area is in square kilometers; and NTowns is in number of towns. Table 2
also shows the summary statistics for the transformed data.
Table 3 shows the results of the OLS estimation. Some coefficients are esti-
mated as being statistically significant, whereas others are insignificant. The
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coefficient of determination (R2) is 0.49. This is relatively high for this type of
cross-sectional data analysis. However, tests for heteroskedasticity (LM-hetero)
and misspecification (RESET) imply misspecification or crucial heteroskedasticity.
Jarque–Bera’s test for nonnormality of the error terms implies that the distribu-
tion of error terms cannot be normal. Robust t values are estimated t values cal-
culated by White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The calculated
standard t values and robust t values are different, so these results also suggest
the existence of heteroskedasticity in the error terms. Then, we plot the fitted
values of the regression equation and residuals in Fig. 1 to check the distribution
of the error terms. This figure implies that the error terms are asymmetric and
Table 1 Coverage of sample for each province or municipality
Provinces and municipalities Sample Total Coverage
Beijing Municipality 5 18 0.278
Tianjin Municipality 4 16 0.250
Hubei Province 138 172 0.802
Shanxi Province 97 119 0.815
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 81 101 0.802
Liaoning Province 43 100 0.430
Jilin Province 41 60 0.683
Heilongjiang Province 65 128 0.508
Shanghai Municipality 3 18 0.167
Jiangsu Province 57 106 0.538
Zhejiang Province 55 90 0.611
Anhui Province 61 105 0.581
Fijian Province 57 85 0.671
Jiangxi Province 80 99 0.808
Shandong Province 91 140 0.650
Henan Province 107 159 0.673
Hubei Province 66 103 0.641
Hunan Province 84 122 0.689
Guangdong Province 74 121 0.612
Guangxi Province 81 109 0.743
Hainan Province 16 20 0.800
Changing Municipality 26 40 0.650
Sichuan Province 139 181 0.768
Guizot Province 76 88 0.864
Yunnan Province 120 129 0.930
Tibet Autonomous Region 72 73 0.986
Shaanxi Province 86 107 0.804
Gansu Province 75 86 0.872
Qinghai Province 38 43 0.884
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region 13 22 0.591
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 86 98 0.878
Total 2037 2858 0.713
“Total” is the total number of county-level jurisdictions in 2009 reported by the 2010 China Statistical Yearbook. “Sample”
is the number of observations used in this paper. “Coverage” is the coverage ratio of the sample to the total
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heteroskedastic. Some of the residuals imply the existence of outliers. A similar
result is found in Solé-Ollé and Bosch (2005), Figure 2, p. 354. They dealt with
this type of problem by applying a piecewise linear regression model. In this
paper, we apply a quantile regression in the next section.
Quantile regression approach
A well-known text on quantile regression is Koenker (2005). This method is usually applied
when the error term has heteroskedasticity with respect to the levels of the dependent
Table 2 Summary statistics
Variables Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Original data
G 118863.8 104488.1 300 1504195
Pop 47.31635 34.89929 0.7 223.9
RPop 38.76117 30.29445 0.1 193.6
Area 4294.808 9945.455 86 198318
NTowns 14.70201 7.995951 1 72
Transformed data
G
Pop 3363.36 2814.228 34.09091 34087.64
1
Pop 0.054245 0.10624 0.004466 1.42857
UPop
Pop 0.20093 0.14346 0 0.99342
RPop
Pop 0.79907 0.14346 0.006579 1
Area
Pop 644.5605 4058.228 2.56667 85662.23
NTowns
Pop 0.5652 0.76666 0.031646 8.57143
Table 3 Estimation results by OLS
Coefficient t value Robust t value
Constant 19860.4 23.842 10.526
NTowns
Pop 1002.82 7.980 4.573
1
Pop 115.802 0.090 0.005
UPop2
Pop −1621.85 −13.424 −6.543
UPop3
Pop 56.5807 10.917 5.849
UPop4
Pop −0.57576 −9.4678 −5.485
RPop
Pop −19200.8 −18.218 −8.712
RPop2
Pop 0.095896 0.006 0.003
RPop3
Pop 0.084069 0.387 0.273
RPop4
Pop −0.00066 −0.710 −0.637
Area
Pop 0.178648 1.580 0.051
Area2
Pop −2.5E−06 −0.777 −0.021
Area3
Pop 2.58E−11 0.810 0.021
Area4





Adj R2, LM-hetero, RESET, and Jarque–Bera are adjusted R2, test for heteroskedasticity, RESET test with squared fitted
values, and Jarque–Bera test for normality. Italicized values mean statistically significant at the 5 % level
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variables. In this paper, we apply this method to multiple regression models with a quartic
function. Details of this procedure are available in Koenker (2005); however, to summarize
this method, we assume a linear regression model with an error term as follows:
yi ¼ X
0
iβþ εi;; i ¼ 1; 2; 3;…;N :
When we estimate the OLS estimator, we minimize the following objective function:








As for the quantile regression, we set a quantile μq and q as follows:





where Fy(μq) is the distribution function of yi. Of course, the inverse function of
Fy(μq) means
μq ¼ Fy−1 qð Þ:
If we assume yi ¼ X
0
iβþ εi; , this inverse function could be rewritten in terms of con-
ditional probability as follows:
μq Xð Þ ¼ FyjX−1 qð Þ:
To estimate βq in a quantile regression requires minimization of the following object-
ive function with respect to βq:
Fig. 1 Fitted values and residuals






















This is a variation of least absolute deviation (LAD) estimation. There exist various
methods to estimate the standard errors of the estimated parameters. In this paper, we
use the LAD command in TSP version 5.0. This command estimates the standard er-
rors of the coefficient using a bootstrap method with 500 replications.
The results of the quantile regression when we estimate eq. (1) with q = 0.1, 0.25,
0.5, 0.75, and 0.9 are shown in Table 4. The results show that some coefficients
are not statistically significant at the 5 % level in all settings of q, so we remove
the corresponding variables from the equation and re-estimate the model. The re-
sults are shown in Table 5 as the selected model. This table shows the OLS esti-
mation results using the same list of explanatory variables. Before going into the
simulation analysis, we should mention about the possible meanings of a variation
according to the setting of q. In the present paper, we do not include the per
capita GDP or other variables as explanatory variables in regression equation. The
effects from these variables present in the error terms and are estimated as a
variation according to the setting of q. In the next section, using these results, we
simulate the effects of UPop, RPop, and Area on G Pop

. This type of simulation
makes the robustness of the existence of the efficient scales.
Simulation for efficient scales
To simulate the effects of changes in the explanatory variables in the multiple
regression equation, we should control all explanatory variables other than the variable
of focus. In this section, we investigate the effects of UPop, RPop, and Area on G Pop

.
Table 4 Estimation results by quantile regression: full model
Quantiles 0.10 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.90
Constant 8437.364 10865.07 14691.87 18867.71 25474.17
NTowns
Pop 186.2419 200.8443 472.8929 1246.982 2323.414
1
Pop 2790.369 2072.114 1612.773 −256.541 −2870.05
UPop2
Pop −582.815 −790.664 −1124.87 −1489.6 −2170.34
UPop3
Pop 17.69066 25.17713 37.11554 52.52024 88.6423
UPop4
Pop −0.1602 −0.24401 −0.36007 −0.5324 −0.96903
RPop
Pop −6867.2 −9253.76 −13284.8 −17565.5 −24829.6
RPop2
Pop −25.0469 −22.1984 −14.4934 −13.016 7.5451
RPop3
Pop 0.27828 0.22899 0.12407 0.16248 0.016699
RPop4
Pop −0.00109 −0.00086 −0.00042 −0.00069 −0.00042
Area
Pop 0.12069 0.29961 0.4339 0.43212 0.36434
Area2
Pop −2.17E−06 −4.66E−06 −7.83E−06 −8.46E−06 −7.46E−06
Area3
Pop 8.35E−12 1.92E−11 4.93E−11 9.98E−11 8.28E−11
Area4
Pop 1.17E−17 −5.10E−18 −9.84E−17 −3.44E−16 −2.85E−16
Adj R2 0.46307 0.47224 0.48437 0.48294 0.47717
Adj R2 is adjusted R2. Italicized values mean statistically significant at the 5 % level
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For the former two populations, we assume a situation in which all the people in the
prefectures live either in the urban or in the rural area: Pop = UPop or Pop = RPop.
First, we simulate the effects of urban population assuming Pop = UPop and
setting the area and number of towns or villages under each prefecture at their
average values: Area ¼ Area― and NTowns ¼ NTowns― . Then, we calculate the ef-
fect of urban population on the per capita government expenditures correspond-
ing to the changes in population as follows:
Table 5 Estimation results by quantile regression: selected model
Quantiles 0.10 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.90 OLS
Constant 9865.556 12879.36 16433.2 19494.19 23919.46 19595.94
NTowns
Pop 372.7542 310.7989 594.6125 1329.612 2163.313 980.2919
1
Pop 2965.341 3612.943 1550.574 1299.058 −3512.63 5.34297
UPop2
Pop −708.287 −1004.27 −1298.16 −1540.59 −1887.98 −1590.68
UPop3
Pop 20.67388 32.16626 42.61537 53.8526 76.49473 55.56158
UPop4
Pop −0.18161 −0.31268 −0.41115 −0.54328 −0.83928 −0.56619
RPop
Pop −9113.59 −12080.4 −15627.1 −18605.9 −22888.9 −18819.8
Area
Pop 0.12268 0.18421 0.39747 0.27226 0.44509 0.19418
Area2
Pop −2.88E−06 −2.83E−06 −7.61E−06 −4.83E−06 −7.99E−06 −2.9E−06
Area3
Pop 1.73E−11 9.67E−12 4.85E−11 6.95E−11 8.22E−11 2.84E−11
Area4
Pop −1.77E−17 8.49E−18 −9.67E−17 −2.65E−16 −2.77E−16 −9.6E−17
R2 0.46899 0.4791 0.48777 0.48514 0.47876 0.50135
Italicized values mean statistically significant at the 5 % level
Fig. 2 Histogram for “Pop”
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where the parameters with hats are estimates and the variables with upper bars are
average values. While the distribution of total populations ranges between zero and
Fig. 3 Histogram for “Upop”
Fig. 4 Urban population and local government expenditure
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2,250,000 people (Fig. 2), urban populations are distributed between zero and
620,000 people (Fig. 3). Therefore, we figure the calculated per capita expenditures
from 2550 to 400,000 people in Fig. 4. From this figure, we can observe that there
exist the points to minimize the per capita expenditures in all the regression re-
sults: OLS, quantile regressions with q = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 0.9. The calculated
points that minimize per capita expenditures are as follows:
OLS : 212,000
q = 0.1 : 264,500
q = 0.25 : 243,500
q = 0.5 : 237,500
q = 0.75 : 210,000
q = 0.9 : 170,500.
There exists a variation according to the setting of q, but it is located between
170,000 and 270,000 people. In particular, for the q = 0.5 and OLS cases, the
points are located mainly around 220,000 people. These results suggest that there
is a most efficient scale for the urban population and it is located around
220,000 people. This variation according to the setting of q may be caused by the
interaction effect between omitted variables and error term in the equation. If q
goes to zero asymptotically, this method becomes similar to that of corrected
least square (COLS) in econometrics for efficiency and productivity.8 Therefore,
if we assume that the case of q = 0.1 is the lower 10 % efficient prefectures
results, the most efficient prefectures minimize their expenditures when their
urban populations are equal to or greater than 264,500 people.
Second, we simulate the effects of the rural population assuming Pop = APop and
setting the area and number of towns or villages in each prefecture at their average
values: Area ¼ Area― and NTowns ¼ NTowns― . Then, we calculate the effect of the
Fig. 5 Histogram for “Apop”
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Rural population distributes between zero and 1,950,000 people (Fig. 5). Therefore, we
figure the calculated per capita expenditures from 10,000 to 1,500,000 people in
Fig. 6. In this figure, some simulated lines cross in the range between 10,000 and
100,000 people; this phenomenon is caused by fixing the number of towns or villages
under each prefecture at their average values, Area ¼ Area and NTowns ¼ NTowns ,
with estimated coefficients for the higher-order quartic equation being statistically
insignificant. Therefore, we do not investigate small rural population cases. When the
population is 100,000 and over, per capita expenditures are slightly decreasing when q
= 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75 and slightly increasing when q = 0.95, and flat in the OLS case.
These results suggest that government expenditures for rural populations vary in
proportion to population size. However, its effects are very small, so per capita govern-
ment expenditures for rural population are almost constant. In other words, total
government expenditures are proportional to rural population. Furthermore, we should
pay attention to the simulated level of expenditures. Comparing the simulated expendi-
tures for rural populations with those for urban populations, we see the former are
much smaller than the latter. For example, the former are about 1300 yuan, whereas
the latter do not fall below 5000 yuan in the q = 0.5 case. This means that the prefec-
tural government that governs a rural population operates cost-effectively.
Fig. 6 Rural population and local government expenditure
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Third, we simulate the effects of area holding the ratios of urban population and
rural population to total population at their average values: UPop Pop ¼ UPop Pop

and APop Pop ¼ APop Pop

, and the number of towns or villages in each prefecture at
their average values, NTowns ¼ NTowns― . Then, we calculate the effect of area on

















































Area is distributed between zero and over 20,000 km2 (Fig. 7). Therefore, we calculate
per capita expenditures from 389 to 16,000 km2 in Fig. 8. The results indicate that per
capita expenditures are increasing slightly in all cases but at a slow rate. These results
suggest that government expenditures corresponding to area are almost constant.
Conclusions
We investigated the effects of urban and rural populations and area size on the expen-
ditures of the prefectural-level local government. Throughout the empirical investiga-
tion, we found the following three results. First, at around 220,000 people, per capita
local government expenditure for urban populations has a minimum value in our simu-
lation. This can also be seen in the simulation results from the quantile regression.
Fig. 7 Histogram for “Area”


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Second, expenditure for rural populations is proportional to population size. Addition-
ally, per capita expenditures are much lower than those for urban populations. Third,
per capita expenditures corresponding to area are almost constant. The last two find-
ings mean that the expenditures are proportional only to population when all the pre-
fectural populations are rural. If we consider these results from another viewpoint,
China’s recent rapid urbanization has increased prefectural government expenditures
substantially. It has also caused fiscal distress among prefectural governments. Lichten-
berg and Ding (2009) also discussed the present trend of land conversion from rural to
urban use and the associated problems.
It is of course impossible to stop the current urbanization trend in China. However,
prefectures that are heavily urbanized should be divided into prefectures of efficient
size, each of which consists of around 220,000 people, and rural populations. This is
similar to the concept of the “garden city” in urban planning, which was examined by
Ward (1992). To consider the level of economic development, it should be called “rural
city.”9 Apart from metropolitan areas, the construction of rural cities from coast to
coast should be the best way to control prefectural government expenditures. However,
this may contradict the findings of Au and Henderson (2006), which showed that more
than half of Chinese cities are undersized from the viewpoint of agglomeration effects
on workers’ productivity. If further migration from rural areas to cities continues to
seek higher wages in urban area, it is difficult to maintain the urban population in each
prefecture at around 220,000. If the Chinese central or local governments cannot
control migration, they should increase tax revenues or find other revenue sources to
finance prefectural government expenditures. Recent measures to reform resource-
related taxation in China are an example of the search for new revenue sources.
Finally, our study has some limitations. First, as we explained in the introduction, we
cannot investigate the efficient scales of specific public expenditures such as police and
Fig. 8 Area and local government expenditure
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fire departments or water supply. If we were able to investigate each type of expenditure,
we could consider the assignment of public services among the five layers of government
or the efficient structures of local government systems. We could also investigate econ-
omies of scale in public expenditures for each item and economies of scope among several
types of public expenditure. For example, Drake and Simper (2002) emphasize the exist-
ence of economies of scope in public service expenditures. The second remaining prob-
lem is a result of the quantile regression approach. The results also shed light on the
existence of the large difference in expenditure between governments of similar size but
in prefectures with differences in terms of urban or rural populations and area size. This
means that some governments spend considerably more than others and some spend
considerably less. If we obtain prefectural socioeconomic statistics, which were used by
Gyimah-Brempong (1989) to examine the determinants of the cost of providing public
safety, we could identify the sources of variation in prefectural expenditures and provide
the comparable efficiency ranking within similar size prefectures. However, because we
cannot obtain the prefectural governments’ expenditures in detail, it remains as an
unidentified problem for which prefectural expenditures are inefficient, rural or urban
population or area. As for the third remaining problem, because of the data availability,
we do not investigate the determinants of the prefectural governments’ expenditures in
other years. This means that we cannot estimate the historical or dynamic changes in the
efficient scale of the prefectural governments. This is also a remaining problem. We
should investigate them in the future research. The fourth problem arises from the roles
of the prefectural governments in the economic development.10 In this paper, we confine
all the effects from the performances of the prefectural governments in supporting
economic development into the residuals of the regression equation. This problem is
crucial for our empirical research, but, at the present stage, we do not have a proper tool
to investigate the performances of the prefectural government in economic development.
One of the difficulties is that we might not assume profit maximization or cost
minimization behavior for the prefectural government. This difficulty prevents us from
taking cost function approach to the prefectural government expenditure. We will also try
to solve this problem in the future research.
Endnotes
1These population and area data are minimums and maximums in the sample used
in this paper.
2Some researchers overcome this problem by logarithmic transformation of per
capita expenditures and explanatory factors and a quadratic function, which is symmet-
ric around the minimum point.
3King and Ma (2000) investigated theoretically the relationship between congestion
and the size of local government.
4Additionally, Andrews et al. (2002) conducted a literature survey of economies of
scale in public education provision.
5We consider the total expenditures consisted by these three components, so we can-
not identify the effects from rural or urban population size if we consider an interaction
term between rural and urban population to capture the effects of economy of scope in
public expenditures. In this paper, we do not adopt some interaction terms as explana-
tory variables.
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6One of the referees suggests Rodrik’s (1988) finding of a positive correlation between
an economy’s exposure to international trade and the size of its government. In our
paper, we cannot obtain the measure for exposure to international trade for each
prefectures
7This total expenditure includes budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures and
expenditures of governmental funds in each prefecture.
8Winsten (1957) first proposed this method. It is referred to as COLS in the econo-
metrics of efficiency and productivity literature; for example, Fried et al. (2008, p. 35)
explains this method.
9Chen et al. (2008) proposed the “compact city” for sustainable growth in China,
focusing on land saving; thus, it is different from the concept of our “rural city.”
10One of the referees also pointed that the role of the prefectural government is not
supposed only to provide public services, but also to promote local development
through promoting local investment to meet financial needs or get political promotion.
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